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The Industrial Meaning of ''Gradualism" : 
The Labour Party and Industry, 1918-1931 
Andrew Thorpe 
In the period from 1918 until 1931, the British Labour party ad- 
hered to the precepts of "gradualism": incrementally and by degrees, 
the party would gain support and pass legislation in an inexorable 
progress toward the socialist millennium. For a while, it seemed that 
this strategy would carry all before it. Emerging from the First World 
War with a "socialist" commitment, it became the largest opposition 
party at the 1918 general election. In 1922 it became the clear opposi- 
tion to the Conservatives, and Ramsay MacDonald was reelected 
leader after an eight-year break. A short-lived minority Labour govern- 
ment in 1924 was followed by heavy electoral defeat, but the party 
was able to form its second minority government in 1929. However, its 
credibility was destroyed by soaring unemployment, and the ministry 
collapsed in the summer of 1931 after failing to agree on public expen- 
diture cuts. MacDonald and the chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip 
Snowden, led a small Labour cohort into a "National" government, 
which went on to crush Labour at the polls that October. Detailed 
work on this complex period of Labour's history is hard to find, how- 
ever. Little work has been done on policy: in particular, it is surprising 
that, given the party's symbiotic link with trade unionism and the 
central role of industry in Labour leaders' conception of the transfor- 
mation to socialism, so little attention has been paid to the party's 
industrial policy in this period. 
Gradualism implied that socialism would emerge from the success 
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of capitalism. Capitalism was morally indefensible, but its growing 
prosperity would lead to higher tax yields, which would in turn be 
used "to an ever-increasing degree" to finance the reforms that would 
lead to a socialist society.' At the same time, though, the scale of 
industry would grow, and more and more people would realize the 
iniquities of capitalism: hence public ownership and control would 
become acceptable and appropriate. This "constantly arising surplus" 
would pay for the reforms that would lead toward the socialist mil- 
lennium .2 
However, prosperity was not the most noticeable feature of Brit- 
ish industry in the 1920s. Britain's nineteenth-century industrial he- 
gemony had been based on the staple industries which produced 
mainly for export: coal, textiles, shipbuilding, and iron and steel. By 
1918 its economy was heavily overcommitted to these areas, and mat- 
ters were made worse by the speculative boom of 1919120. When the 
boom burst in 1920, firms were left with huge long-term debts. The 
boom period strengthened the unions, and as wages rose and hours 
were reduced, production costs increased. At the same time, export 
markets were lost or not retrieved, competition from other exporters 
increased, and the fall in commodity prices meant that the primary 
producing countries which had been the backbone of British export 
markets were now less able to import goods. And although there is 
controversy, it does seem that industry also suffered from the return 
to the gold standard in 1925, which overvalued the pound against other 
currencies, increasing export prices still further. 
The effect of all this on the staple industries was grim in the ex- 
treme. Coal was in a particularly bad position. Coal owners tried to 
cut wages and extend hours to regain competitiveness, but the main 
result was a drastic deterioration in industrial relations leading to 
lengthy lockouts in 1921 and 1926, which in turn meant a further loss 
of markets. As mechanization spread, labor displacement problems 
increased. Cotton also suffered severe difficulties, with rising Indian 
tariffs and growing Chinese competition landing particularly heavy 
blows. The value of exports fell by a third between 1913 and the mid- 
1920s. High unemployment and short-time working were endemic 
throughout the period. And, as with coal, lack of investment meant 
obsolescent plant and a distinct lack of confidence about the future. 
Shipbuilding was also in dire straits. Unemployment was never less 
' P. Snowden, Socialism and Syndicalism (London, [1913]), p. 142. 
Labour Party, Labour and the New Social Order (London, 1918), p. 21 (hereafter 
cited as New Social Order). 
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than twice the national average: in 1923 almost half the industry's 
insured workforce was unemployed, and by mid-1930 the collapse of 
the industry seemed imminent.3 Iron and steel had better prospects, 
since it fed into expanding industries at home, but it too struggled 
against low productivity, falling exports, and a high degree of insol- 
vency and was in "chronic depression" for most of the p e r i ~ d . ~  
The development of "new" industries was more encouraging. The 
motor industry expanded considerably, helped by the fact that it pro- 
duced largely for the domestic market. There was "vigorous develop- 
ment" in electrical engineering. Chemicals and artificial textiles also 
experienced considerable expansion. However, the view that these 
industries, even in the 1930s, formed a "development block" leading 
the British economy onto higher planes of growth is now largely dis- 
credited; that means, in turn, that in the 1920s "British industry" still 
meant, essentially, the staples, and "such was the commitment to the 
staple industries even in 1928 that no attempt to cure the unemploy- 
ment problem could ignore their troubles." Furthermore, there was a 
paradox at the heart of British industrial policy. To regain competitive- 
ness, the staples needed to reduce their costs. But this would have 
meant a loss of purchasing power in the domestic market on which the 
new industries relied. Conversely, any increase in purchasing power to 
help the new industries would have increased exporters' costs, so mak- 
ing them still less c~mpeti t ive.~ Clearly, then, there were challenges to 
be met-challenges, indeed, that were essential for a radical reforming 
party to at least address. Labour should have had a lot to say. But did 
it? 
I 
In 1918 the party adopted the program Labour and the New Social 
Order, the basis of its policy until 1928. It characterized the optimism 
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its author, Sidney Webb, was to hold regarding the prospects for pros- 
perity and socialism until 1929130. Capitalism, the document stated, 
might "indeed have received a death-blow" from the extensions of 
state power which had accompanied the First World War. Certainly, 
it argued, every effort should be made to ensure that "indispensable" 
industries taken over by the state during the war should remain under 
public control. The key element, though, was Labour's commitment 
to increasing "the nation's aggregate annual production" in order to 
finance "social reconstruction." This could not be achieved by aban- 
doning British industry to "a jostling crowd of separate private em- 
ployers" but only by "a scientific reorganization of the nation's indus- 
try . . . on the basis of the Common Ownership of the Means of 
Production." In more concrete terms, Labour and the New Social 
Order advocated an industrial strategy which was, ostensibly, quite 
integrated. Mines, railways, and electricity would be nationalized, en- 
abling cheap power and transport to be provided to minimize indus- 
try's costs. Wartime state control of the import and allocation of raw 
materials would be retained and used to favor more efficient producers. 
This, in turn, would mean far greater state control of industry as a 
whole. In many ways, this was merely an extension of the wartime 
economic functions of the state: indeed, the program was not so much 
a plan for radical reform as a defense of the status quo represented by 
the wartime state. One negative legacy of wartime was the huge in- 
crease in the national debt: here Labour proposed a capital levy 
(wealth tax) which would also help industry insofar as it would reduce 
future taxation and so release funds for reinvestment and modern- 
i ~ a t i o n . ~  
But this strategy was open to objections, not least because it 
clashed with other Labour aims. Webb was keen, for example, to fix 
maximum prices and minimum wages. At the same time, he wanted 
government to maintain stable levels of employment by varying its 
orders for public works with the vicissitudes of the trade cycle. Labour 
was also committed strongly to free trade.7 But all this posed problems. 
How were high wages and low prices to be reconciled? True, there 
Economic Recovery in Britain, 1932-39 (London, 1967); A. Booth and M. Pack, Employ-
ment, Capital and Economic Policy: Great Britain, 1918-1939 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 3-5. 
For the capital levy, see R. C. Whiting, "The Labour Party, Capitalism and the 
National Debt, 1918-24," in Politics and Social Change in Modern Britain: Essays 
Presented to A. F .  Thompson, ed. P. J .  Waller (Brighton, 1987), pp. 140-60. 
'Labour Party, New Social Order, passim; Labour party National Executive Com- 
mittee (NEC) minutes, November 13, 1918, National Museum of Labour History, Man- 
chester; Labour Party, Labour's Call to the People (general election manifesto, London, 
1918). 
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would be incentives to efficiency, and cheaper power and transport. 
But there remains a suspicion that Labour was trying to have things 
all its own way. The impact of a high and stable level of employment 
on wage bargaining was not considered, nor could it be, given Labour's 
links with the unions. Yet how, then, could industry remain competi- 
tive, which it would need to be, given Labour's commitment to free 
trade and the primacy of exports? The hope was expressed that inter- 
national action could effect a worldwide improvement in wages and 
conditions, but a more likely scenario was the decline of exports and 
the flooding of Britain by cheap imports, the balance of payments 
implications of which were horrendous. Above all, the capital levy, 
conceived originally as a "scientific" means intended solely to pay off 
the war debt, began to emerge as a panacea. This was not, then, a 
program likely to succeed. 
This might not have mattered. Labour was not likely, in 1918, to 
be asked to form a government. The real problem was that Labour did 
so little after 1918 to sharpen up its industrial policy, so that on the 
eve of MacDonald's first administration, Webb could write privately 
that "the one thing that neither I, nor anyone else could write now is 
'What a Labour Government would do'!"' 
The party had failed, by 1924, to think much about its industrial 
policy. In February 1918 the party's national executive committee 
(NEC) set up nine advisory committees, one of which was to look at 
"Industrial Policy." From the start, it was a sickly creature. Its chair 
and secretary were F. W. Purdy and J. J. Mallon, respectively, hardly 
leading luminaries (in contrast, J. A. Hobson and G. D. H. Cole held 
these positions on the committee on trade and finance). By the end of 
the year, in contrast to most of its counterparts, it had issued no re- 
ports. After the 1922 election, the advisory committees were reorga- 
nized: out of twelve committees, only "Industrial Affairs" and two 
others were still without a chair a year later, whereas the committee 
on finance was now chaired by Snowden. From 1925 onward, the 
committee seems to have existed only on paper. That a party based 
so centrally on the need for industrial prosperity had no functioning 
advisory committee on industry tells its own tale. A special committee 
on national production was set up in 1922 with a brief to look at indus- 
trial policy, but its progress was slow, and it does not seem to have 
survived the collapse of most joint activities with the Trades Union 
Labour Party Annual Report (LPAR), 1923 (London), p. 178; S. Webb and B. 
Webb, The Letters of Sidney andBeatrice Webb, ed. N .  Mackenzie, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 
1978), 3:186, Sidney Webb to W. A. Robson, December 16, 1923. 
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Congress (TUC) in 1925. In any case, it produced little of value.9 
Margaret Cole contended later that while some of the committees "had 
long and fruitful lives," others were "amateurish in the extreme and 
died young": it is not hard to see in which category the industrial 
policy committee fell. lo 
The lag was not made good by intellectuals. R. H. Tawney's The 
Acquisitive Society (1921) is usually seen as a classic statement of the 
socialist case, but it was particularly weak on industry, despite Taw- 
ney's service on the Sankey Coal Commission in 1919. Beyond advo- 
cating the abolition of the rentier and the professionalization of the 
workforce, he had no concrete proposal for the reform of industry 
short of public control." But even those intellectuals who had some 
economic background rarely discussed the issues seriously. For exam- 
ple, Hugh Dalton, one of the party's few trained economists, largely 
ignored industry in his work. The Webbs did little to develop the strat- 
egy outlined in Labour and the New Social Order, with Sidney happy 
to chaff employers for playing too much golf.I2 G. D. H. Cole was, 
for much of the period, lumbered with the declining guild socialist 
movement; after its demise he did offer positive proposals, but this 
work only appeared in 1929, too late to have much effect on party 
policy in this period.13 Various attempts to set up "think tanks" came 
to nothing before 1930.14 
Labour had done little by 1924 to sharpen up its message on two 
things in particular: nationalization and the capital levy. In 1919, Ar- 
thur Henderson, the party secretary, had asked an alarmed Webb to 
draft "a complete scheme for 'Socialising Industry'-the whole of 
industry . . . and show that . . . socialization was applicable to-day to 
all ind~stries." '~ But this mood soon passed, not surprising in view of 
NEC minutes, February 27, 1918; NEC minutes, joint meeting of NEC and parlia- 
mentary committee of TUC, April 10, 1918; NEC minutes, December 18, 1918; LPAR, 
1923, p. 38; LPAR, 1925, p. 70; LPAR, 1926, p. 63; LPAR, 1927, p. 66; LPAR, 1928, 
p. 45; LPAR, 1922, p. 4; LPAR, 1924, pp. 47-48. 
lo M. I. Cole, The Life of G.  D. H .  Cole (London, 1971), p. 104. 
" R. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London, 1921), pp. 14, 75, 89, and The 
British Labor Movement (New Haven, Conn., 1925), p. 153. 
IZ S. Webb, National Finance and a Levy on Capital: What the Labour Party 
Intends (London, 1919), p. 5. 
l3 G. D. H. Cole, The Next Ten Years in British Economic and Social Policy (Lon-
don, 1929); see also N. B. Riddell, "The Age of Cole?" Historical Journal (1995), in 
press. 
l 4  See, e.g., Jones (n. 4 above), 1:275, March 28, 1924; B. Webb, Beatrice Webb's 
Diaries, ed. M. I .  Cole, 2 vols. (London, 1952-56), 2:129, January 29, 1927; 1:167, 
September 24, 1919; 2:230, December 2, 1929. 
l5 Ibid., 1:167, September 24, 1919. 
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the collapse of the postwar boom and the rapid decontrol of industry 
in 1920-21. Most socialists at the time seem to have agreed with the 
Webbs that any such scheme would be excessive: Tawney argued 
that nationalization's "special sphere [would] be the great foundation 
industries."I6 But which industries were to be nationalized? Labour 
and the New Social Order had been clear-coal, railways, and electric- 
ity. In the case of coal, the impetus was increased when the Sankey 
Commission reported by a narrow majority in favor of nationalization. 
The rapidly deteriorating position of the industry, plus the miners' 
strong position within the party, meant that Labour concentrated its 
efforts here, helped by the formulation by the Miners' Federation of 
Great Britain (MFGB) of a full scheme for nationalization. This in- 
cluded a minister of mines, who would appoint coal commissioners to 
oversee the industry. Beneath these there would be coalfield-based 
district boards advised by pit committees. There were hopes in 1919 
that Sankey would produce a "landslide into the communal control of 
industries and services," but the party's sights were gradually low- 
ered, so that by the time of the 1922 election the party was concentrat- 
ing on the mines and railways alone.17 The latter, having been re- 
grouped as regional monopolies in 1921, were deemed "ripe" for 
nationalization. The committee on production tried to define further 
industries for social ownership but did not get far.'' Thus Labour man- 
aged, arguably, to get the worst of both worlds. Its proposals for na- 
tionalization were so thin that they were unconvincing, while their 
existence at all allowed Labour's opponents to play the "red scare" 
card with some effect. 
Similarly, Labour did little to define more rigorously how indus- 
tries would be run after nationalization. This was particularly signifi- 
cant given that there was, between 1910 and the early 1920s, a debate 
about industrial democracy more vibrant than at any other time before 
the 1970s. Webb had largely avoided the issue in Labour and the New 
Social Order. But for a while the issue remained alive, Cole and others 
arguing that all industries should be run by their workers on guild 
lines.19 In 1922 the Independent Labour party (ILP) adopted a guild 
l6  Ibid.; S. Webb and B. Webb, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of 
Great Britain (London, 1920), pp. 168-69; Tawney, p. 123. 
l7  F. Hodges, "Nationalisation of Industry: The Mines," in Book of the Labour 
Party, ed. H .  Tracey, 3 vols. (London, 1925), 2:16; B. Webb, Diaries, 1:162, June 23, 
1919. 
18LPAR,1924, pp. 47-48. 
l9 G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated (London, 1920), pp. 66-67. 
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socialist stance. However, the economic slump, the increasing appeal 
of Communism to erstwhile guild socialists, and the destruction of the 
remains of the shop stewards' movement in the 1922 engineering lock- 
out were all body blows, reinforced the following year by the collapse 
of the National Building Guild, of which Cole had had very high hopes. 
By 1925 Cole was in significant retreat, and by 1929 he was admitting 
that he had been "compelled by the movement of events to think out 
afresh [his] social and political creed."20 For a time, all sorts of people, 
including MacDonald and the later devotee of the bureaucratic public 
corporation model, Herbert Morrison, had felt forced to state their 
support for a considerable measure of workers' control; even the 
Webbs sketched out a model which, while very different from that of 
Cole, was a good deal more "democratic" than that ultimately adopted 
in the 1940~ .~ l  However, the overall effect of the controversy about 
workers' control was to militate against any firm Labour efforts to 
define more clearly its message on nationalization. 
The party also failed to sharpen up its message on the capital levy. 
Labour and the New Social Order had proposed a tax on individual 
wealth exceeding f 1,000 in order to pay off at least "a very substantial 
part" of the national debt. This would relieve industry of a huge tax 
burden in the future: as Dalton argued, "the [resultant] lightening of 
taxation would . . . increase the productivity of industry."22 MacDon- 
ald, not yet party leader, spoke strongly in favor of the levy during 
the 1922 election campaign, when it again formed a centerpiece of the 
Labour manifesto. The pledge was repeated at the 1923 election, but 
by now it was rather ritualistic, and, as shown below, nothing came 
of it. 
The Conservatives' decision to fight an election in 1923 on the 
tariff issue allowed Labour to concentrate on the defense of free trade 
to the virtual exclusion of all else. But this was merely the culmination, 
for Labour, of a process of retreat from the distinctive parts of its 
industrial program in an attempt to capture the "political middle 
ground." Instead of using these years of opposition to adapt and de- 
velop its message, Labour had drifted onto the easier territory of ne- 
gation. 
G .  D. H. Cole, "Principles of Industrial Reconstruction," in Tracey, ed., 
1:273-74, and Next Ten Years, p. vii. 
2' J. R. MacDonald, Sociulism: Critical and Constructive (London, [1921]), pp. 
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p. 324, minutes of meeting June 14, 1922; LPAR, 1924, p. 151, Morrison; Webb and 
Webb, Constitution, pp. 168-86.
''H. Dalton, The Capital Levy Explained (London, 1923), p. 52. 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first Labour government (January- 
October 1924) pursued an unremarkable industrial policy. At the cabi- 
net level there was little discussion of industry at all, and attempts to 
set up a committee of economic inquiry came to nothing.23 No attempt 
was made to introduce the capital levy.24 This was not due, primarily, 
to Labour's minority position in Parliament: the real reasons were 
more complex. First, there was doubt as to how much the levy would 
yield: the party quoted £3,000 million, but the Inland Revenue antici- 
pated only a third of that amount.25 Second, the levy had been pro- 
posed originally at a time of boom, and once that had passed, there 
were fears that, far from improving matters, the levy would make 
things worse.26 This was linked, third, to a reaction against the idea 
in quarters outside the party. It was seen increasingly, especially by 
MacDonald and Snowden, as an electoral liability.27 Above all, per- 
haps, the party leadership had a wary eye on its followers, for many 
of whom the levy had gradually developed into a money tree: for 
example, a conference delegate claimed in 1924 that it would raise 
enough money to cut working hours to absorb all the unemployed with 
no loss of wages.28 The government buried the issue by referring it to 
a committee on taxation, which took three years to report that the 
levy was no longer practicable. By that time even Dalton, one of its 
keenest advocates, had given up.29 An innovative means of relieving 
the national exchequer of a massive burden, and so releasing money 
either for tax cuts or for a more "forward" industrial policy, had been 
lost; by 1929 there was no proposal for reducing the internal war debt 
beyond the rather conservative conversion operations favored by 
Snowden. 
Little more was done to push for nationalization. The 1923 mani- 
festo had called for public ownership of the mines, railways, and elec- 
23 Jones, 1:284, diary entry, July 7, 1924. 
24 D. Marquand, Ramsay MucDonald (London, 1977), p. 282; R. W. D. Boyce, 
British Capitalism at the Crossroads, 1919-1932: A Study in Politics, Economics, and 
International Relutions (Cambridge, 1987), p. 5 1. 
25 Dalton, Capital Levy, p. 79; J .  E. Cronin, The Politics of Stute Expansion: War, 
Stute und Society in Twentieth-Century Brituin (London, 1991), p. 84. 
26 H. Dalton, Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs, 1887-1931 (London, 1953), pp. 131- 
32; Philip, Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, 2 vols. (London, 1934), 2595. 
"Dalton, Cull Back Yesterday, pp. 138, 140, 143; Snowden, Autobiography, 2:595. 
28 LPAR,  1924, p. 163, W. McNeill (Glasgow trades and Labour council). 
29 Dalton, Call Back Yesterday, pp. 173-75; Marquand, pp. 475-77; Public Record 
Office (PRO), MacDonald papers, 30/69/1753/4, Snowden to MacDonald, October 14, 
1927. 
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tricity. However, nothing at all was done about the railways, despite 
the fact that they were, arguably, the most ripe for nationalization. 
Proposals for electricity reorganization were approved by the cabinet 
but were left, as it turned out, for the next Conservative government 
to implement. There was more action on the mines. The MFGB's 
scheme formed the basis of a private member's bill for which the 
government allowed parliamentary time, but to which it refused for- 
mally to commit itself; it was defeated on second reading.30 By the 
end of the summer the government was framing its own legislation to 
nationalize the mines, but of course this collapsed with the ministry 
that October. 
The government's industrial strategy, such as it was, was to en- 
courage a revival in "ordinary trade."31 The first interim report of 
Webb's cabinet committee on unemployment stressed that the "only 
real cure [was] such a revival of normal trade activity as [would] auto- 
matically re-absorb unemployed workmen [sic] into their accustomed 
occupation^."^^ This emphasis was not surprising, not least because 
out of the seven trade unionists in the cabinet, there were five from 
the staple trades, plus a railwayman. And, since trade had been reviv- 
ing quite strongly since the latter half of 1923, this line did not seem 
wholly fanciful. 
The government's strategy to help the staples was basically three- 
fold. It tried not to increase, and where possible to reduce, their costs. 
First, legislation to cut hours was postponed, and a proposal for holi- 
days with pay was excluded from the Factories Snowden, as 
chancellor, abolished the unpopular Corporation Profits Tax and gen- 
erally cut taxes in order to stimulate purchasing power and offset de- 
mands for wage increases which might further undermine competitive- 
ness. Second, the government aimed to improve international 
relations, in the hope that this would stimulate trade: hence the Dawes 
Plan on reparations and the recognition of, and attempt to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with, the Soviet Union. Finally, the government 
launched a wide-ranging inquiry into the state of British industry under 
the businessman Sir Arthur Balfour. 
However, this commitment to the staples clashed with the expan- 
30 R. W. Lyman, The First Labour Government, 1924 (London, [1958]), p. 224; 
PRO, cabinet papers, CAB 23/48/32 (24), cabinet conclusions, May 15, 1924. 
3' Jones (n. 4 above), 1:269, diary entry, February 1, 1924; Dalton, CallBack Yester-
day, p. 148. 
3Z Quoted in Garside (n. 3 above), p. 148. 
-'-' PRO, CAB 23/47/25 (24), cabinet conclusions, April 7, 1924; PRO, CAB 23/48/30 
(24), cabinet conclusions, May 7, 1924. 
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sion of newer industries, and Labour's policy decisions were generally 
negative. The decision to abolish the McKenna Duties (a 33 113 percent 
tariff on "luxury" imports, such as cars) had damaging effects- 
import penetration in automobiles rose from 15 percent in 1924 to 28 
percent a year later, when the Conservatives reimposed them.34 The 
government also did all it could to prevent the formation of an Anglo- 
German dyes 
It would, of course, be unfair to be too critical of the government, 
given its weak parliamentary position and its desire to prove, above 
all, Labour's "fitness to govern." Even so, Labour had very little to 
offer in the way of industrial policy. It had jettisoned the capital levy 
as a means of relieving industry of its burdens; its proposals for nation- 
alization were scarcely worked out; and it had no idea that special 
policies might be needed to help the newer industries. It remained 
essentially committed to the view that the staple industries would re- 
cover to a very large extent, though probably not to their prewar level, 
and to allow this to happen it deliberately avoided action in other 
areas. 
Labour was heavily defeated at the general election of October 
1924, but this did not prompt any major rethinking of Labour's ap- 
proach, least of all on industrial policy, where there was now a virtual 
vacuum. Labour still rejected alternative proposals but had little else 
to say. Any form of protection was ruled out by all but a few M . P . s . ~ ~  
For most, it would "keep prices high, profits high, and wages and the 
amount of employment low," bring "lobbying, corruption and unem- 
ployment," and mean the public being "mercilessly fleeced and 
robbed."37 The party favored, instead, the establishment of good inter- 
national relations and the development of the economic functions of 
the League of Nations to enforce worldwide standards of wages and 
conditions, which would eliminate the excessively cheap production 
which led to "unfair" c~mpe t i t i on .~~But this hardly offered a rapid or 
straightforward solution to the problems faced by many British indus- 
tries. 
Labour's internationalism and reluctance to depart from an ideal- 
34 Sir A. Balfour and Sir J. Cadman, "Report on the Economic Outlook," May 
1930, quoted in S. Howson and D. Winch, The Economic Advisory Council, 1930-1939: 
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178; Miller and Church (n. 5 above), p. 194. 
35 PRO, CAB 23/47/17 (24), cabinet conclusions, February 28, 1924; PRO, CAB 231 
48/45 (24), cabinet conclusions, July 30, 1924. 
36 Dalton, Call Back Yesterday (n. 26 above), p. 158. 
37 180 H.C. Deb. 5s., cols. 760-61, 759, February 16, 1925, T. Shaw. 
38 LPAR 1925, p. 91; 180 H.C. Deb. 5s., cols. 747-48, February 16, 1925, Dalton. 
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ized vision of the pre-1914 world were also seen in its reaction to the 
return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in May 1925. While it 
was not the major reason for British industry's difficulties in the latter 
half of the 1920s, it does seem to have had an adverse effect on the 
export trades. Yet Labour's opposition was muted in the extreme.39 It 
fell to ILP left-wingers, already becoming marginalized within the La- 
bour party, to drive home that the effects on industry would be "ad- 
verse in the e~treme."~'  
Labour also opposed subsidies to private industry, at least partly 
because of fears that such payment would worsen international rela- 
tions. Although the granting of a nine-month subsidy to the coal indus- 
try in July 1925 was celebrated in the wider Labour movement as 
"Red Friday," it alarmed and appalled the party leadership. A party 
committee ranging from Morrison to George Lansbury and James 
Maxton rejected contemptuously Sir Alfred Mond's scheme for the 
payment of money from the unemployment insurance fund to firms 
to subsidize empl~yrnent.~' This negative stance was to come under 
increased pressure, though, and Labour was soon to be forced to re- 
think its ideas on industrial policy. But the reappraisal was to be cau- 
tious, the process largely reactive, and the effects at best partial. 
The persistence of mass unemployment was one stimulus to new 
thinking. The return to gold was replete with symbolism about re- 
turning to the prewar situation, but unemployment remained stub- 
bornly over one million. This led politicians of all parties to redouble 
their efforts to find a credible solution, while within the Labour party 
the salutary effects on the TUC leadership of the failure of the 1926 
General Strike enhanced the prestige of the parliamentary leadership. 
Next, the left wing of the party began to produce policies which 
were both more comprehensive and, in many ways, more convincing 
than the official party line. In 1925 a recent recruit, Sir Oswald Mosley, 
published his Revolution by Reason, a complete scheme for the re- 
structuring of Britain's industrial base which aimed greatly to reduce 
the reliance on exports. The ILP, for its part, adopted the "Living 
39 183 H.C. Deb. Ss., cols. 626, 630, May 4, 1925, Snowden; 183 H.C. Deb. 5s., 
cols. 641-42, May 4, 1925, H. B. Lees-Smith; cols. 659-62, May 4, 1925, F. W. Pethick-
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40 183 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 826. May 5, 1925, C. Stephen. 
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of standing committee on unemployment, land reform, and emigration. 
96 THORPE 
Wage" program, proposals of a transitional nature aiming to bankrupt 
capitalist industry by forcing it to pay "uneconomically" high wages 
and so force it into the hands of the state.42 While both were open to 
serious objections on political and economic grounds, they did offer 
distinctive alternatives which, if not countered by Labour, might come 
to be seen as the official line; and at a time when they were keen to 
portray the party as moderate and respectable, the party's leaders 
could not allow that to happen. 
At the same time, there seemed to be a danger of Labour being 
left high and dry by its mainstream rivals. The Conservatives were 
developing safeguarding (protection against foreign dumping for spe- 
cific industries) and derating of industrial premises. The Liberals, 
meanwhile, were producing spectacular interventionist plans from 
Lloyd George's accession to the party leadership in 1926 onward, cul- 
minating in the "Yellow Book" of 1928. These were at least superfi- 
cially attractive and seemed linked to a revival in Liberal electoral 
fortunes from 1927 onward. 
Finally, moves within industry itself, both at home and abroad, 
also increased the pressure. At the 1926 party conference, rumors were 
"rife" about "new departures in trusts and syndicates in Germany 
and the USA."43 From about this time there was a great upsurge in 
talk of a new "industrial revolution," and, given the then-prevalent 
view of what the original had entailed, this was not a prospect to 
gladden the hearts of L abo~ r i t e s . ~~  There had long been, of course, a 
trend toward larger industrial operations in Britain, but the 1920s saw 
"a hitherto unprecedented wave of mergers that was not subsequently 
emulated until the 1 9 6 0 ~ . " ~ ~  Many business leaders now came to see 
a conscious move toward larger and more efficient units of produc- 
tion-"rationalization"-as a cure for their ills, hoping that it would 
cut costs more effectively than a frontal assault on wages. Indeed, 
many employers, and some members of the Labour movement, be- 
lieved that larger-scale industry would be able to pay higher wages, 
42 R. K. Middlemas, The Clydesiders: A Left-Wing Struggle for Parliamentary 
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since production and marketing would be streamlined and goods made 
more ~ompe t i t i v e .~~  The amalgamation of the major British chemical 
firms into Imperial Chemical Industries in 1926 was seen by many as 
a successful precedent to be followed. And, as rationalization seemed 
to be spreading elsewhere, there seemed to be a danger that Britain 
would be left behind.47 The more "progressive" employers realized 
that they would be able to rationalize more effectively if they could 
obtain union agreement, and this led to the Mond-Turner talks in 1928. 
By 1927, then, there was a growing feeling within the party that 
it should redefine its policy. The result was a new program, Labour 
and the Nation, formally adopted in 1928. It was a ragbag of vote- 
catching proposals, put together in a tone of moderation to beat off 
Liberal and Conservative challenges for the perceivedly all-important 
middle ground of British politics. Moderation is not necessarily a bad 
thing, but vagueness and waffle almost always are, and, indeed, it was 
as much its imprecision as its lack of radicalism that aroused criticism 
at the 1928 party c on f e r e n~e . ~~  Nevertheless, it passed effortlessly and 
became the basis of the 1929 election manifesto. 
Labour and the Nation argued that the staple industries were so 
important that action must be taken rapidly to help them recover. It 
was "vital" to restore "normal trade." Candidates for early national- 
ization were coal and power, the railways, industrial life insurance, 
the Bank of England, and the land. However, with the exception of 
coal, there was little indication-or idea-as to how this would be 
done. Other industries were not yet ready, but they would benefit from 
a number of changes. Public ownership of the Bank of England would 
make the financial sector more sensitive to the needs of industry, while 
nationalization of rail would help cut costs. Rate burdens on industrial 
premises would be reduced. A Labour government would conduct a 
full investigation of the cotton industry with a view to "a comprehen- 
sive and well-considered scheme of reconstruction" (there was no no- 
tion that, in opposition, Labour might have carried out at least a pre- 
liminary investigation in order to offer something more concrete as 
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soon as it entered office). But the greatest faith was again placed in 
international action: efforts would be made to help exporters by the 
negotiation of tariff reductions, and industries producing for the home 
market would be protected through Labour's efforts to strengthen the 
International Labour Organization. No fallback position was offered 
in the event of such efforts failing. Working-class purchasing power 
would be boosted to "increase the demand for staple commodities and 
assist the restoration of the chief industries of the country." How this 
was going to be achieved, given the party's commitment to "sound 
finance" and its reluctance to increase tax burdens and industrial 
costs, was not made clear; but in any case, the statement was a non 
sequitur. An increase in domestic spending power would have done 
little to help the staples, which depended on the export market; indeed, 
if it had raised their wage costs or tax burdens, it would simply have 
left them in a more parlous state still. The increase might have been 
presented as a way of assisting the development of the new industries, 
but here the program was silent. There was even more tension, if not 
contradiction, in the treatment of rationalization. Industrialists were 
entreated to rationalize, the resulting short-term unemployment being 
offset by raising the school-leaving age, pensions reform, and assisted 
emigration. Rationalization, however, meant the establishment of large 
combines; but a major part of the program, entitled ominously "The 
Menace of the Trust," strongly condemned such operations as "one 
form or another of industrial feudalism." The only alternative was 
socialism, "the conduct of industry as a public service, democratically 
owned and responsibly administered." But Labour and the Nation 
had stated explicitly that most of British industry was not yet ready 
for such control.49 (The 1929 manifesto was to propose nationalization 
only for coal, plus inquiries into cotton and iron and steel.) This confu- 
sion was to run like a deep fault through the industrial policy of the 
second Labour government. 
The 1929 election was a close-run affair. The Conservatives' two- 
hundred-plus majority of 1924 collapsed, and although they won more 
votes than Labour, they took fewer seats, and the second minority 
Labour government was formed. Labour's lack of a coherent industrial 
strategy meant it rapidly settled on rationalization as its central policy, 
but it is important to see why it rejected other options. 
49 Labour Party, Labour and the Nation (London, 1928). 
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Some, like nationalization, were scarcely considered at all. Even 
in coal, no effort was made, despite the existence of a scheme, and 
despite the manifesto pledge. This was understandable, insofar as the 
Liberals would not have supported it, but even if Labour had had a 
majority, there are grounds for believing that it would not have been 
advanced. More surprising, the nationalization of coal royalties, which 
was supported by all sides of the mining industry, was not attempted. 
However, the MFGB was split over whether compensation should be 
paid, and the cabinet first fudged the issue and then, in October 1930, 
agreed to postpone it indefinitely. By that stage the government was 
trying to provide as stable an environment as possible for industry, 
and any measure of nationalization, it was felt, might have had adverse 
effects on business confidence which would have far outweighed any 
benefits to the coal indu~try.~' 
Labour's opposition toward direct subsidies continued. The Fed- 
eration of British Industries (FBI) wanted Treasury grants to assist the 
basic industries to reorganize, but this met firm opposition, not just 
from Snowden, who was again chancellor, and the Treasury, but from 
the bulk of the Labour m~vement .~ '  In private, MacDonald seems to 
have become less unfavorable as the economic situation worsened, 
but he got short shrift from his advisers on the new Economic Advisory 
Council (EAC) when he asked them to look again at the Mond scheme 
for using the unemployment insurance fund to subsidize industry.52 
His government colleagues remained firmly opposed to "doles to in- 
dustry," which would involve "an enormous outlay," the results of 
which would be "highly debatable."53 
In theory, a third proposition was a devaluation of sterling. But 
it remained theoretical. MacDonald, for one, realized that there was a 
problem,54 but Snowden, with the Bank of England and the Treasury, 
was adamant that devaluation was unthinkable, and few people of 
any political persuasion were prepared to argue otherwise before the 
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summer of 1931. This was not just Treasury obscurantism. Labour 
was trying to pose as the party of sound finance in contrast to the 
previous Conservative government: Winston Churchill's period as 
chancellor (1924-29) had become a byword for profligacy and irrespon- 
sibility. At the same time, Labour had much credibility to lose if, in 
its first extended period in office, it devalued the pound. In addition, 
Snowden and many others believed sincerely that to devalue the pound 
was to debase the hard-won savings of the poorer sections of the com- 
munity. Finally, the adverse effects on business confidence of a deval- 
uation of sterling by a Labour government which was, by its very 
nature, deeply distrusted in business circles, would probably have off- 
set any benefits. 
Perhaps more surprising was the failure of the government to pay 
much attention to the possibility of boosting the development of new 
industries. Economists were aware of their potential to revive the na- 
tion's economic fortunes, although they differed as to the extent to 
which they could "replace" the staples.55 Ministers paid lip service to 
the employment potential of, say, the motor industry, but very little 
was done to help it. It was not until February 1931 that the cabinet, 
prodded by junior ministers and industrialists, moved. Clement Attlee, 
chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, argued that the state should 
assist and direct the development of new industries in depressed areas. 
MacDonald set up a committee on new industrial development under 
J. H. Thomas to investigate, but it did not, in the event, report until 
1932, long after the government's demise; and, in any case, its report 
was more concerned with the application of "science" to industry as 
a whole, rather than with the specific questions raised by Attlee.56 
Essentially, MacDonald and his colleagues shared the skepticism of 
their Conservative predecessors in this area. The government re-
mained committed to the view held by the party since 1918, that the 
primary task was the rescue of the staples. In their defense, it must 
be said that new industries would not solve Britain's problems over- 
night. Even so, the government's imperviousness to increasing calls 
to diversify the nation's industrial base did not do it credit, and still 
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less so did its interference with tariffs such as the safeguarding duties 
for the dyestuffs industry, which only made matters worse.57 
But, of course, Labour remained committed to free trade despite 
a growth in protectionist sentiment in practically all quarters in the face 
of the slump and the worsening trade balance. Labour had maintained 
throughout the 1920s that there was no realistic alternative to free 
trade. However, the McKenna Duties were strongly supported by 
workers in the motor industry, and, in many of the forty-nine industries 
which had applied for safeguarding under the Conservatives, the 
unions involved had supported the app l i~a t ion .~~  But many of the 
strongest unions in the Labour party catered mainly to workers in the 
staples and still looked to export markets: hence they were usually as 
fervent in their economic internationalism as most of the party lead- 
ership. 
The first few months of the Labour government saw vigorous 
attempts to give effect to this line. The government rejected a safe- 
guarding application (backed by the unions) from the woollen industry 
and announced its intention to allow the existing safeguarding duties 
to lapse when they came up for renewal. However, efforts by the 
president of the Board of Trade, William Graham, to secure a "tariff 
truce" were largely abortive in the face of intensifying world recession, 
and by January 1930 MacDonald was suggesting privately that free 
trade might have to be a b a n d ~ n e d . ~ ~  Snowden was forced, mainly by 
revenue considerations in the face of a deteriorating budgetary posi- 
tion, to abandon his plans to repeal the McKenna Duties. However, 
he was still strong enough to block moves for a full inquiry into trade 
policy, and in June 1930 the cabinet ignored H. D. Henderson's pro- 
posal for a 10 percent revenue tariff.60 That summer, MacDonald, 
Thomas, and Vernon Hartshorn tried to block ratification of the tariff 
truce but were defeated.61 Despite growing union doubts, the strength 
of free trade sentiment was demonstrated at that October's TUC, and 
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although the FBI and the Conservatives were fully protectionist by 
October 1930, Labour had to face the winter of 193011 on a free trade 
platform.62 Thus Labour's leaders continued, with varying degrees of 
conviction, to damn tariffs, and a further proposal for a revenue tariff 
was safely buried by referring it to a cabinet committee packed with 
free traders.63 The free traders remained so strong that it was not until 
the death throes of the government that a cabinet majority could be 
found for a tariff. But by then, of course, it was too late; and even 
then it was conceived, not as a protective tariff to assist industry, but 
as a revenue tariff to alleviate budgetary pressure and so avoid a cut 
in the rate of unemployment benefit.64 
It is, of course, a moot point as to how far the adoption of tariffs 
would have helped British industry. The effects on the exporting sta- 
ples could not have been very positive, and might even have been 
negative in the sense of provoking foreign retaliation. But some indus- 
tries would have benefited, and it scarcely increased business confi- 
dence to have a government sticking with apparent bloody-mindedness 
to free trade. However, as seen above, the government had no clear 
conception of the role of the new industries; and, given the Labour 
movement's greater strength in the exporting sectors (which were 
heavily unionized), and the hopes the government continued to have 
for a general pacification of Europe, it was not surprising that tariffs 
were ruled out. 
Another way in which government might have tried to help indus- 
try was by cutting its costs of production. But little was done. The 
classical solution for industry's ills, much touted at the time, was to 
cut wages. Both MacDonald and Snowden expressed sympathy with 
this view in private.65 The government did sponsor some wage-cutting 
settlements of industrial disputes, but wage cuts offended the whole 
Labour ethos: the idea of solving capitalism's problems in this way was 
opposed by hard-headed trade unionists and ethical socialists alike. 
Furthermore, many Labourites rejected the rationale for wage cuts: 
far from invigorating industry, they would reduce purchasing power 
and so depress industry even further; and they would bring no long- 
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term gains, since employers abroad would simply follow suit in a "sui- 
cidal progress" toward abject poverty and international ill-feeling.66 In 
any case, as Hartshorn recognized, the problem was that markets had 
shrunk: Britain could cut wages all it liked, but it would still not restore 
markets to their prewar size.67 So Labour rejected wage cutting as "a 
policy of despair. "68 
A further possibility was to cut public expenditure so as to ease 
the tax burdens on industry and release more money for investment. 
This cry was taken up by many businessmen and economists. H. D. 
Henderson advocated a moratorium on redistributive legislation to 
allow industry time to reequip.69 By mid-1930 a wide range of business 
opinion was calling for cuts in state benefits so that taxes could be 
reduced, and by early 1931 a strong "economy" movement was in 
train, with businessmen saying "it was no use talking to the govern- 
ment about reforms in industry until they showed some signs of tack- 
ling the much more necessary measures of economy and retrench- 
ment."" The Labour party officially rejected this line of reasoning, 
but some of its leaders did sympathize. Snowden believed that the 
way to socialism was through the taxation of prosperous capitalist 
industry, but when industry was not prosperous it was, he felt, nonsen- 
sical to increase its burdens further. Even before the 1929 slump he 
had believed that taxation had reached its maximum feasible level, a 
view shared by MacDonald and tho ma^.^' However, major cuts in 
public expenditure, like wage reductions, were a political impossibility 
for Labour. Indeed, far from cutting expenditure, the government al- 
lowed it to rise during its period in office; given the surge in unemploy- 
ment, this was inevitable. Thus any tax concessions to industry were 
ruled out. 
Infrastructure development might have helped to reduce indus- 
try's costs, as Labour and the New Social Order had suggested. The 
government did inaugurate public works on a relatively large scale, but 
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it was hardly likely, given the political, administrative, and budgetary 
constraints, that there would be any serious overhaul of the infrastruc- 
ture. Nevertheless, what is most interesting is the defensive and depre- 
catory way in which Labour ministers referred even to these efforts. 
Calls by pcople like Ernest Bevin (general secretary of the Transport 
and General Workers' Union) to advance public works as a means of 
improving industrial prospects were ignored.72 Instead, such schemes 
as were implemented were variously described by ministers as "main- 
tenance,'' "additional unproductive relief," "the making of roads and 
bridges," and "merely dealing with roads and bridges."73 The govern- 
ment failed totally to see them as part of a package of measures which 
might actually make British industry more efficient or competitive. 
It would be facile to claim that all or even most of the above 
options were really open to the second Labour government. Neverthe- 
less, Labour's failure to move in any of these directions was largely 
inevitable given its development during the 1920s and meant that its 
industrial policy was, to all intents and purposes, dominated by the 
very problematic panacea of rationalization. 
In the later 1920s many Labourites had embraced rationalization 
enthusiastically, since it seemed to offer a way of making the staple 
industries more competitive without the need for wage cuts, and, like 
socialism, it denied the validity of the "free market," hence providing 
some common ideological ground. MacDonald had believed for years 
that combination was an inevitable and desirable step toward making 
industries "ripe" for nati~nalization.~~ As seen above, many trade un- 
ionists were favorable; while recognizing that there might be some 
displacement of labor, this could be offset by special displacement 
payments to redundant workers, an increase in the school-leaving age, 
and better pension^.^' 
But there was also skepticism shading into outright opposition. 
The left argued, with more passion than consistency, that rationaliza- 
tion could not work because capitalism was doomed; but that if it did 
72 LPAR, 1930, p. 185, Bevin. 
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work, it would raise working-class living standards and so act as a 
barrier to socialist advance.76 For many, it was simply wage cutting 
by other means, as one delegate put it at the 1928 TUC: "Rationaliza- 
tion will mean to our class . . . a speeding-up, an increase of unemploy- 
ment, and a necessary lowering of the standard of life. If it does 
not, . . . what the hell do you want rationalization for? . . . If rational- 
ization does not mean harm to working-class interests, . . . then what 
use is rationalization to British capitalism in its attempts to capture 
world markets?"77 It meant an intensification of international rivalry 
which would lead to war and a diminution of the power of trade unions, 
particularly those which catered to skilled workers.78 However, such 
criticism from the left did little to move a Labour leadership which 
had spent most of the last decade marginalizing the radical elements 
within the party. 
The government took the line of the Balfour Report (1929) that 
rationalization could be done most effectively by industries them- 
selves, without direct state i n~o lvemen t .~~  In June 1929 it set up inquir- 
ies into the cotton and iron and steel industries. The following spring 
the Bank of England formed the Bankers' Industrial Development Cor- 
poration (BIDC) to finance reorganization schemes. This was done at 
the behest of the minister responsible for rationalization, Thomas (lord 
privy seal). The reliance on rationalization as almost the sole basis of 
the government's industrial policy was thereby confirmed, and its main 
efforts were reserved for three of the big staples: coal, cotton, and 
iron and steel. 
In the case of coal, nationalization was, as seen above, ruled out, 
but action on hours and organization was not. Graham's Coal Mines 
Bill, published in October 1929, aimed to reduce the maximum working 
day from eight to seven-and-a-half hours, set up district cartels with 
production quotas for each mine, establish a national levy to subsidize 
exports, and appoint advisory committees to oversee the operation of 
district schemes. The bill was criticized by the Liberals on the grounds 
that the cartels would support inefficient mines at the expense of effi- 
cient ones. Since the government relied on Liberal votes, a Part 11was 
added to the bill, creating a Coal Mines Reorganization Commission 
(CMRC) to force amalgamations through. The miners were also dissat- 
76 LPAR, 1928, p. 213, John Wheatley; Middlemas (n. 42 above), p. 221. 
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isfied, because seven-and-a-half hours was no reduction in some areas, 
and because the House of Lords amended the legislation to allow the 
"spreadover," which meant that eight hours could be worked in a day 
so long as no more than ninety hours were worked in a fortnight. 
Problems with the miners, the Liberals, and the Lords all made the 
passage of a complex bill very protracted. It finally became law in 
August 1930, after eight gruelling months and eighty-eight divisions in 
Parliament. That November, Graham stated wearily that the govern- 
ment had "no desire" to become involved in similar legislation again; 
and undoubtedly the problems faced with coal made it still more deter- 
mined to adopt a less dirigiste approach with other indu~tries.'~ 
With cotton, there were hopes that a more voluntarist approach 
could succeed. The Lancashire Cotton Corporation (LCC) had been 
formed to reduce excess capacity before Labour came to power. The 
government spent a year investigating cotton, and when the report was 
published in July 1930, it suggested reduction of costs (in a "cordial" 
manner), amalgamations, greater cooperation within the industry, and 
the replacement of traditional with automatic looms in the weaving 
section. However, by September the cabinet was expressing "disap- 
pointment" at the lack of progress being made and considering the 
possibility of taking compulsory powers. But this was little more than 
bluster; ministers were not really in a position to force their will on 
the industry." The report on iron and steel produced even less. The 
industry's immediate reaction to its publication was to demand a pro- 
tective tariff. When the government rejected this, iron and steel simply 
sat back and waited for a more sympathetic government to take over.82 
The only full-scale critique of rationalization came from Mosley, 
who as chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster was one of Thom- 
as's nominal assistants. Although rationalization was necessary-
"Socialism is not a device for the maintenance of obsolescent 
plant"-it was not a panacea, he argued.83 A more thorough approach 
M. W. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry, 1870-1946: A Political and Eco- 
nomic History (London, 1977), p. 131; Dalton, Political Diary (n. 60 above), pp. 95-96, 
June 3-9, 1930; 244 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 527, November 3, 1930, Graham. 
" PRO, CAB 23/64/32 (30), cabinet conclusions, June 18, 1930; PRO, CAB 581132, 
"Report of the Committee on the Cotton Industry," July 4, 1930, pp. 18-21; PRO, CAB 
23/65/57 (30), cabinet conclusions, September 30, 1930; Streat (n. 56 above), 1:30-31, 
February 18, 1931. 
'2 Jones (n. 4 above), 2:263, June 3, 1930; PRO, CAB 23/64/40 (30), cabinet conclu- 
sions, July 11, 1930; PRO, CAB 23/64/46 (30), cabinet conclusions, July 30, 1930; PRO, 
CAB 23/66/16 (311. cabinet conclusions. March 4. 1931. 
" 234 H.C. ~ e b .  ~anbary  21, 1930; Jones, 2:257, May 19, Ss., col. 101, ~ o s l e ~ ,  
1930. 
107 INDUSTRIAL MEANING OF "GRADUALISM" 
was needed, and he advanced it through the "Mosley Memorandum," 
drafted in early 1930. This aimed to cut unemployment and renew 
Britain's industrial base by a combination of protection, development 
of the home market and new industries, and extensive public works. 
However, Mosley's ideas failed to convince the cabinet, which stuck 
to the line that had emerged over a decade of Labour thinking-or 
failure to think-about industry. Mosley resigned in May 1930; the 
party's policy remained essentially unchanged. 
Did rationalization help? Thomas argued subsequently that his 
efforts had not been in vain and that much of the credit for Britain's 
economic recovery in the 1930s should go to his work in the 1929-31 
period.84 But most historians have been a good deal less sanguine. For 
one thing, the government remained aloof from many of the develop- 
ments taking place: at best it did little to obstruct changes which were 
taking place anyway. In cotton, for example, the LCC had already 
begun its work when Labour took office; and it might be argued that 
the biggest contribution the government made toward the reduction of 
capacity in the industry was to stand by while many firms went bank- 
rupt. Little assistance was given to the LCC, and even after more 
direct state intervention in 1936, the industry continued to have consid- 
erable excess capacity.85 In coal a more dirigiste approach was no 
more successful. After the Liberals' intervention, the Coal Mines Act 
was fatally flawed. The impetus toward amalgamation contained in 
Part I1 was vitiated by the cartel agreements in Part I, which guaran- 
teed all pits a share of the market and so buttressed the inefficient 
mines. And, in any case, the CMRC proved to be far less powerful 
than its advocates had hoped.86 
The results of rationalization under the second Labour govern- 
ment, then, were far from impressive. This was due, partly, to causes 
over which the administration had very little control. The attitude of 
business itself was a problem. Many people accustomed to better times 
could not bring themselves to recognize that the contraction in world 
markets was permanent. There remained considerable hostility toward 
state interference, especially when it came from a Labour government 
which was formally, at least, dedicated to the abolition of private enter- 
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prise. Many business people were openly skeptical of the supposed 
advantages that rationalization would bring, and they were by no 
means wholly wrong. The rationalization movement tended to proceed 
more by assertion than by argument, and even those industries which 
did rationalize often found few real advantage^.^' Finally, most indus- 
trialists were reluctant to commit themselves to rationalization without 
a quid pro quo in the form of protection (e.g., iron and steel) and/or 
public economy (e.g., cotton).@ Yet, as seen above, these were things 
the government could not deliver. Conversely, by October 1930 the 
Conservatives were fully protectionist; by the following January they 
were espousing public economy with alacrity. With the government's 
political and electoral position weakening steadily, there seemed less 
and less point in getting a bad deal from MacDonald when they could 
hope for a much better one from Baldwin. 
There was, in addition, no decent administrative structure through 
which rationalization could be pursued. There was no Ministry of In- 
dustry, and one of the most impressive features of the government's 
industrial policy was the number of ministers who were in some way 
involved in it. Thomas, as lord privy seal, took charge at first; even 
when he was moved to the Dominions Office in May 1930, he kept 
some control over rationalization, although his successor, Hartshorn, 
and Clement Attlee, who replaced Mosley as chancellor of the duchy, 
now became more ~ignif icant .~~ But Attlee's appointment as postmas- 
ter-general and Hartshorn's subsequent death in March 1931 meant 
still less continuity. Cotton rationalization, meanwhile, was kept sepa- 
rate: the enquiry was chaired successively by Graham, A. V. Alexan-
der (first lord of the Admiralty), and J. R. Clynes (home secretary).% 
Clynes and Graham became a kind of double act, and they did not 
play to an appreciative audience within the industry, which often did 
not know with whom it was supposed to be dealing.91 MacDonald's 
formation of the Economic Advisory Council in January 1930 merely 
added to this confusion: it was to provide more in the way of source 
material for historians than useful advice to ministers. 
The confusion did not go unnoticed at the time. In July 1930, 
Attlee produced a cabinet paper proposing the establishment of a Min- 
istry of Industry as "the organ of conscious direction of national eco- 
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nomic life" and with a much more dirigiste approach toward rational- 
ization. But the cabinet did not even discuss the paper until December 
1930, and then the proposal was largely shelved, with Treasury bless- 
ing.92 It might have been possible in May 1929, but by late 1930, with 
pressure for public expenditure cuts mounting, it was too late, in any 
case. Once again, Labour's failure to think out its plans in the years 
of opposition had let it down. 
Failing a Ministry of Industry, Labour was left with little alterna- 
tive but to rationalize through the banks. The latter were owed huge 
debts by many firms as a result of the speculative postwar boom and 
had already assisted rationalization schemes as a way of improving 
the prospects of eventual repayment. However, there were problems. 
Although Thomas claimed that leading bankers were favorable, the 
Banker magazine concluded that this was not really so.93 Thus progress 
was extremely slow. The BIDC's interventions were often tactical- 
seeking to diffuse pressure for state action-rather than strategic. In 
addition, the need to preserve the gold standard meant that the Bank 
had to manage interest rates in a way that was often detrimental to the 
interests of industries clamoring for cheap money.94 All this aroused 
considerable Labour criticism, but the government resisted demands 
for direct state in te r~en t ion .~~  And, with the Macmillan committee 
investigating the relationship between finance and industry for most of 
the government's life, calls for sterner action could always be dis- 
missed with the line that it was best to wait for the committee's report. 
Thus banking considerations joined industrial resistance and ad- 
ministrative problems to help block any serious rationalization of in- 
dustry during this period. However, there were other obstacles too, 
and these drove to the heart of the Labour party itself, so preventing 
it from becoming truly a party of industrial modernization. 
The first of these was the symbiotic relationship between the party 
and the trade unions. While the unions could not, generally, force the 
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government to do things, they could, usually, prevent it from taking 
measures to which they were strongly opposed. The TUC had ap- 
proved rationalization in 1928, but that was in the context of relative 
economic prosperity, when it seemed that labor displacement prob- 
lems could be dealt with without too much difficulty. However, the 
slump from 1929 onward hardened attitudes considerably. Apart from 
unemployment, there were two major worries. First, there was a grow- 
ing recognition that rationalization would mean major changes in work- 
ing practices. Even "forward-thinking" trade union leaders like the 
TUC general secretary, Walter Citrine, and the leader of the iron and 
steel workers, Arthur Pugh, were worried about giving up such prac- 
tices without some quid pro quo on the part of employers or powerful 
state i n t e r~en t i on .~~  But given the employers' attitudes and the govern- 
ment's distancing of itself from the rationalization process, neither was 
likely. And, given renewed pressure for wage cuts, rationalization was 
seen increasingly as just another way of reducing working-class living 
standards. The "more looms" dispute in the Lancashire cotton indus- 
try, which began in 1930, seemed to confirm the view that reorganiza- 
tion meant simply more effective exploitation of labor.97 Second, the 
government's growing insistence on the need to prune back the staples 
worried unions in those industries, and those unions formed a major 
section of the Labour party. Of the 1,700,000 members affiliated to the 
party through the twelve largest unions, in 1931, almost 650,000 (38 
percent) were in staple industry-based unions; in addition, the general 
unions included many such workers, while the railway workers, 
closely tied to the staples, represented a further 288,000 members (17 
percent). Thus Labour was hamstrung in its attempts to modernize 
industry by its dependence on the very unions which would suffer 
most from rationalization. 
But unemployment caused more worry than anything else. During 
the lifetime of the second Labour government, unemployment rose 
from 1.1 million to 2.8 million. Many cherished policies, like naval 
disarmament, were themselves contributing to the problem. It was 
generally acknowledged that rationalization would make matters worse 
before it made them better. Concrete illustrations abounded. In ship- 
building, where there was little government intervention in the pro- 
cess, the National Shipbuilders' Security, Ltd., was buying up and 
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closing down yards. Steel rationalization in 1929 led to the closure of 
works in Yorkshire and Lancashire. Opinion might have been less 
unfavorable if steps had been taken to compensate the displaced work- 
ers or to restrict the size of the labor market through improved pen- 
sions and an increase in the school-leaving age. But the first was ruled 
out, on cost grounds, much to the chagrin of the unions; Mosley's 
proposals for massive public works and the vigorous development of 
new industries were rejected; and pensions reform and the bill to raise 
the school-leaving age both collapsed ignominiously .98 Increasingly, 
Labour backbenchers came to attack industrial reorganization as leav- 
ing behind it "a great trail of ruined homes and broken men and 
women."99 In these circumstances, rationalization, however neces-
sary, was a political albatross for the Labour government. 
There was also strong feeling within the Labour party against the 
kinds of combinations and trusts which it was believed would result 
from rationalization. The leadership saw combination as leading in 
theory to public ownership, but this was not how it looked to many 
Labourites. Throughout the 1920s, indeed, Labour rhetoric had at- 
tacked the process.'00 This reaction was encouraged by the rise of 
protectionist sentiment from mid-1930, since protection would remove 
free trade as the last defense of the consumer against the rapacious 
demands of monopolistic producers. Thus there was a dilemma. 
Should Labour encourage rationalization in the knowledge that it 
would lead to greater trustification? Or should it try to restrict such a 
movement, even if this meant damaging the long-term interests of Brit- 
ish industry? It was a dilemma which was never resolved in this period. 
The decisive factor inhibiting rationalization was not a doctrinaire 
commitment to "socialism" at the expense of reality.lO' The argument 
that it was not worth tinkering with capitalism because it would inhibit 
progress toward socialism, or because socialism was doomed in any 
case, had been present in debates throughout the 1920s and gained 
support as the economic situation worsened between 1929 and 1931. 
But the government itself was firmly committed to rationalization and 
did its best, within severe constraints, to implement it. True, industry 
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might have been more cooperative had Labour not been pledged to 
the ultimate extinction of private enterprise; but it cannot be claimed 
that this made the decisive difference. 
In any case, there were all sorts of perils in rationalization. It 
seems probable that workers displaced by the process so far as it did 
progress in these years were among the multitudes queuing up to deal 
Labour a devastating defeat at the 1931 general election. Certainly the 
experience of Weimar Germany was to suggest that relatively "suc- 
cessful" rationalization could have severe political side effects.'02 It 
may be that there were worse fates to await a nation than an outdated 
industrial base. 
As is well known, the second Labour government collapsed igno- 
miniously in August 1931. MacDonald, Snowden, and Thomas de- 
parted the Labour scene to lead the National government with Conser- 
vative and Liberal support. At that October's general election, Labour 
put forward a radical election manifesto in which few of its leaders 
seriously believed and which reverted from half-measures like rational- 
ization to full-blooded nationalization. Labour was, of course, heavily 
defeated. But at least Labour's catastrophic defeat at that election 
cleared the way for new ideas and policies to come forward. 
The real failure of Labour's industrial policy in the 1920s had been 
the lack of advanced planning. In that period, perhaps understandably, 
the strategy of the Labour leadership (accepted by the great majority 
of its supporters) had been to consolidate and extend the party organi- 
zation, to appeal as far as possible to the political "middle ground," 
and to exclude "disruptive" elements. In order to succeed in this it 
had had deliberately to keep its policies in theory dynamic and exciting 
but in reality superficial and bland: hence the playing down of national- 
ization and the capital levy by middecade. But this left it prey to all 
sorts of problems, not least the fact that, in desperation, it had to turn 
to rationalization as virtually the sole basis of its industrial policy in 
1929-31. Then, faced with massive problems, it had failed to make 
any serious impact on the nation's creaking industrial structure. 
In retrospect, this is not surprising. If the industrial meaning of 
gradualism was, in a very real sense, to consolidate and rationalize 
industrial undertakings, then the political strategy of gradualism-the 
lo* R. A. Brady, The Rationalization Movement in German Industry:A Study in the 
Evolution of Economic Planning (New York, 1933), pp. 416-18. 
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attempt to be as many things as possible to as many people as possi- 
ble-clashed with it to such an extent that it could not be effected. 
Other tensions also limited Labour's room to maneuver. The structure 
of the Labour party gave great leverage to the staple industry-based 
unions. There was a basic conflict between seeing mergers as the way 
of "ripening" industries for nationalization and long-standing radical 
traditions which saw monopoly as a form of industrial feudalism. And, 
crucially, there was a paradox between the party's unifying anticapital- 
ist rhetoric and its need to build socialism on the back of successful 
private enterprise. 
This period held a legacy for Labour's future industrial policy. 
First, it increased the party's distrust of voluntarism: in the future, it 
was felt, there should be no cooperation with bankers and cajoling of 
industrialists: they should instead be told what to do, and do it. Sec- 
ond, there was a renewed emphasis on nationalization as the cure 
for Britain's industrial ills. Thirdly, the collapse of the movement for 
industrial democracy meant that nationalization would be carried out 
through the profoundly bureaucratic model of the public corporation. 
The only remaining point at issue was whether trade union bureaucrats 
would be in on the act or not. And, finally, rationalization per se was 
discredited. Even the Labour leaders who had most favored it were, by 
early 1932, either political opponents (MacDonald, Snowden, Thomas, 
Mosley) or dead (Graham, Hartshorn). The way was clear for a new 
regime. However, for all its innovations, it was still keener on pana- 
ceas rather than policies when it came to industry. It would only be a 
shade too unkind to say that only the buzzword changed, as "plan- 
ning'' replaced "rationalization" as a widely accepted but little worked 
out or understood policy for dealing with industry.'03 In many ways, 
Labour's relationship with industry would prove as difficult and un- 
easy after 1931 as it had been before. 
'03 For an early example, see G. D. H. Cole, British Trade and Industry: Past and 
Future (London, 1932), pp. 434-35. 
